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Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, said in his State of the Union address (Strasbourg, 14 September 2016) : "our Union is going through an existential crisis". It is not the first time we hear or we say such words. In fact, the European construction has been a continuous questioning about who we are and what we want to be. How many times have we said that "Europe is at a crossroads"? Or that its crises are the engines of its construction? From the empty chair in 1965 to the failure of the European Constitution in 2015, crises and crossroads have been the permanent state of a project that was on its way, as Machado would have interpreted the community method.
Indeed, Monnet / Schumann told us that Europe will not be done in one go and that it will be the result of solutions to its crises. And that these (both crises and solutions) will be the forgers of its identity. Until recently, it seemed that it was indeed that way. The European integration project has been strengthened by its crises and increasingly defined by reference to a set of values shared by the Member States and their citizens.
But this time it may be different. The first Vice-President of the Commission, the Dutch Social-Democrat Frans Timmermans said that "for the first time, I fear that the European project can fail." For Enrico Letta, former Italian Prime Minister: "With the unresolved economic crisis, the Brexit, terrorism, the refugee crisis, we are living an unprecedented situation that calls into question the European project itself." Mario Monti, former European Commissioner of competition, diagnoses that "the mechanism has broken down, crises no longer provide new energies as on previous occasions." And the President of the European Parliament Martin Schultz denounces the lack of political will by part of the governments of the Member States to deepen the EU integration.
It is easy to list the components of the current crisis: economic uncertainty, institutional weaknesses, lack of leadership, resurgence of populisms, nationalisms and xenophobic manifestations that would have been unthinkable a few years ago, instability of our Mediterranean neighbors and religious fundamentalisms, with their fallout of immigration, refugees and terrorist threats, the return of war on the borders to the East, the loss of Europe's geopolitical weight in a multipolar and disorderly world. And as a finishing touch can be added the NorthSouth confrontation on economic policies, and the East-West one on immigration.
In this context, the citizens' perception of the European project has also changed a lot. Particularly in Spain. 30 years after the accession to what we were calling then the
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European Communities, we have moved from an uncritical enthusiasm to a growing disaffection. For my generation, intrinsically pro-European according to Ortega's saying "Spain as a problem, Europe as a solution", those 30 years have been the best in our modern history since the Battle of Trafalgar. And the EU has helped us greatly in our economic and political progress.
But my students at the Faculty of Economics do not have the same perception. Of those 30 years, they are aware of what they experienced in the last 7, which have been those of the economic crisis and the European political project. For us, Europe was a good fairy that was financing our infrastructures, was distributing subsidies and was giving us international credibility. But the perception of the young generations is rather that of a stepmother, bad by definition, which imposes unpleasant disciplines that are nonetheless unable to solve the problems.
In addition to this generational divide, another one has been created between the North and the South of Europe, which manifests itself both in terms of expectations and present realities. Germany and the countries of the North expect the South to be able to grow economically without accumulating public and private debt, and to implement structural reforms that liberalize the economy and combat tax evasion and political corruption. The countries of the South, whose societies and economies have been weakened by the crisis, call for greater financial solidarity and more time to carry out those reforms.
It must be acknowledged that much progress has been made in coping with the crisis, by completing the institutional framework of the monetary union and its ability to react financially to the markets. But those same advances that were not contemplated in the rules before the crisis, have raised problems of legitimacy of the European decisions, whose solution would require to advance towards a political union.
However, given the new problems of migration, terrorism and destabilization in the neighboring countries, the current climate of growing populism and anti-European parties is unfavorable to undertaking ambitious reforms of the EU and the eurozone, which past experience shows to be risky.
It is significant that the new "road map" adopted at the Bratislava European Council (16 September 2016), which should be concluded in March 2017 at the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, aims to"provide citizens with an attractive Europe which they can have confidence in and which they can support." It is a statement that concisely summarizes Europe's existential crisis. As if it implicitly recognizes that to the European citizens the current Union is not attractive, nor can it be trusted or supported.
Making the Union more attractive by bringing it closer to the citizens is something that sounds familiar to us because we have heard it several times in the past. It is an imperiously necessary goal. But the problem is that, because of the way the EU was built, i.e. based on peace and the market, but limiting the devolvement of sovereignty, it cannot offer Europeans the protection they claim in the face of the risks of the present.
As Thierry Chopin of the Schumann Foundation says, the Pax Europea, because the EU is fundamentally a peace project and for that reason it was given the Nobel Prize, is not a guarantee for social peace in the face of the economic crisis, nor for security in the face of terrorism, nor for the protection of its external borders in the face of an unstable world. And that is why Europeans are looking back to their old nation-states, and sometimes even want to disintegrate them into regional units that they feel closer. Because the States remain the actors for the basic functions of internal and external security, and of social redistribution, through which the citizens find the protection they require.
In addition, the crisis has made it evident that economic integration and monetary union are no longer"unifying"but divisive factors. Never before had the European economies diverged so much as with the euro crisis. The economy appears as a new way of expressing today's rivalries and conflicts of power. As happens on a global scale with the social rejection of greater trade and border openness. They tell me that in Portugal a new word, "troicado", has appeared, that comes from Troika, and means"punished".
In order to understand the current crisis of the European project, it is necessary to relate it to the exhaustion of the reasons that gave impulse to that project and the lack of a "narrative", of the"vision"that the British did not like when the European Convention was discussing the future of the Union which they were then part of.
What were those raisons d'être, those driving forces that have promoted European integration with the more or less explicit consent of the citizens? In the past those reasons were clear, but to a great extent they have lost their cogency and their mobilizing force because the objectives to be reached have already been achieved.
The first was undoubtedly peace, peace among the Europeans on the ruins of a destroyed, hungry and threatened continent. "Never again war" was the goal of three generations of Europeans. But this objective has already been fulfilled. If not impossible, war is unthinkable in Europe. No young European thinks for a moment that he would fight against his Erasmus companion. Given our background, this is extraordinary progress. But once that goal is fulfilled, peace is no longer a mobilizing goal.
With regard to the maintenance of external peace, that is to say, that on its borders, the EU's raison d'être has shown to be much weaker, as demonstrated by our inability to stop the Yugoslav wars, that were reproducing on a smaller scale, and an hour distance by plane from Rome or Vienna, the horrors of World War II. In the new century, the goal of external peace has been pursued through enlargements, real or promised, as with Turkey and Ukraine, without knowing very well up to where the enlargement had to be pushed and with what consequences. But an area without borders, without precise geographical terms of reference can hardly pretend to hold an identity. And it is difficult to keep talking of European identity based on our values when we have to entrust the surveillance of our borders to a country which took an autocratic drift like Turkey, in order to prevent refugees, whom we do not want or we do not know how to receive and integrate, from entering our continent.
After the achievement of internal peace, the next major objective should have been to endow ourselves with a truly common defense and foreign policy. But this implied to share the same vision of the world, from which the Member States are quite distant, because each one of them cherishes its own historical experiences that have shaped its identity. Even so, most Europeans, including the Britons, claim to want such policies at the European level, but their national elites are reluctant to really take such a leap in political integration.
The other aims of European integration were to face the threat posed by the Soviet Union, until its demise, the rehabilitation of Germany, which culminated in its reunification, the incorporation of the countries of the East after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which meant to prioritize the enlargement rather than to deepen integration, which substantially altered the dimension and homogeneity of the European political and economic space.
But those reasons, those driving forces, are already history. The proposed objectives have been achieved. Germany is rehabilitated and reunited. It has found a "niche" in globalization that has boosted its economy. Europe was a good framework for the political rehabilitation of Germany. And France, which had lost its colonial empire, was allowed by being in Europe to play a greater political role than it was entitled to. As Z. Brzezinski said: "Through Europe, France wanted to reincarnate itself in its past, and Germany to redeem itself from it". So, what could the new raisons d'être of European integration be, that could give a new impulse to a project that runs the risk of dying out slowly? A good reason could be to face globalization with the dimension that unity would give us in a world of giants. Globalization has generated many losers in Western societies, as it has been now discovered in the electoral campaign in the USA. Rebuilding the social state, the identity mark of post-war Europe, in the new scenario of globalization is a task that Europeans would do better together than each country separately. The return to the nation-state and to the control of one's borders is an illusion. Re-nationalization will not solve problems that have an intrinsically supranational dimension. It will not stop migrant flows or prevent monetary instability, but it will make disagreements between states stronger. The maintenance of the status quo is another illusion, because it is not a viable option in the medium term, given the shortcomings that the current system of European governance has already manifested.
We must revive a European ambition. Europe faces above all a crisis of democratic legitimacy and the greatest challenge we have is to give it a clear purpose and a common vision that goes beyond the economy and regulations. It requires a feeling of belonging, and this must be built from a European project that gives citizens a greater protection than the one their own nation-state can offer. It is necessary to put an end to the feeling that the EU is "an open space without protections", by launching concrete initiatives. The EU was created in the last century to solve its own problems, with an inword approach. But migrations, climate change, energy security, the fight against poverty and inequality, especially in Africa, are the new global challenges that require an outward approach, on which to build the new European narrative. That should be the ambition that allows us to overcome our existential crisis. And if we, if not all of the current member-States at least a small but determined number of them, are not able to do so, within 30 years the EU may have died or fallen into insignificance.
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